We introduce a simple adaptive rule where agents choose a cooperative e ort on a grid. Agents can adjust this e ort step by step and Gains and Losses Adjust Directions. We show that this process converges to the cooperative outcome in a two-person Prisoners' Dilemma game, and we provide simulations showing that the results also holds with a larger number of agents.
Introduction
Cooperative behavior is widespread among both, humans and animals, and has even been documented among viruses [20] . Models explaining the emergence of cooperation range from models of direct reciprocity (variations of \tit-for-tat") [1, 2, 6, 10, 12, 21, 22] via indirect reciprocity models [13, 14] and models of spatial interaction [8, 9, 18] to aspiration-based models [7, 15, 16, 17, 11] . Most of these models view behavior as adaptive and rules driving adaptation typically require substantial cognitive capabilities.
Reciprocity, for example, requires that individuals have an understanding of how others a ect their payo , i.e., they require that individuals have a mental model of the world [19] .
Here we introduce an adaptive rule (GLAD) that is much simpler and could help to explain why cooperation is observed in non-human species. In particular, GLAD does not require any knowledge about how own payo s depend on others. In fact, it does not even require knowledge about the existence of others. Yet, it does yield cooperation. GLAD prescribes that individuals who choose a cooperative e ort, increase (decrease) their e ort step by step as long as their payo increases. If it decreases, the direction of adjustments is reversed. This process converges to cooperation in dilemma games.
Players engage in a symmetric game in which the strategy space can be ordered along one dimension. This could be the \degree" or \intensity" of cooperation but, in general, it could also be something which a ects the degree of cooperation only indirectly, for example, the time spent hunting or caring for members of a group. As in the case of time, the action variable might be continuous but we assume that chosen actions are taken from a grid (that can be arbitrarily ne though). Actions are adjusted by moving either one step up or down the grid (in discrete time). The adaptive rule we introduce prescribes the direction of adjustments. It says: Go another step in the same direction if the last step increased your payo . If not, switch directions.
As Gains and Losses A ect the Direction of adjustments we shall call the rule GLAD. GLAD is related to (aspiration-based) win-stay, lose-shift strategies that implement Pavlovian ideas [11] . Our model is related to models by Fort [4, 5] who also studies agents who increase of decrease their level (here a probability) of cooperation depending on how good the last payo was in comparison to some other variable.
However, in Fort's models the comparison variable is not the previously obtained payo but a payo expectation based on the assumption that all 1 Pavlovian strategies that can induce cooperation are also discussed by Brauchli et al.
[3] who nd that they do particularly well in spatially structured populations.
other agents use the same probability of cooperation. Insofar, Fort's models require far more sophisticated agents than ours. Moreover, our agents achieve higher levels of cooperation than Fort's.
The model
To analyze how GLAD induces cooperation we introduce a simple continuous n-person prisoners'-dilemma (PD) game (though our ndings can be extended to a larger class of games). In our model each individual i chooses an e ort x i 0 which directly bene ts all other players j 6 = i. However, player i has to incur costs of x i with 1; 0 < 1 and
Thus, a player's payo function can be written as
and the non{cooperative (Nash) equilibrium is clearly given by zero cooperation, i.e., by x N i = 0 for all i. The cooperative solution is found by
with respect to all x i 's. An interior solution exists for all > 1 and is given 
For = 1 and < 1, (1) is satis ed independently of x i . For > 1, consider a Taylor expansion of the right hand side of (1) at = 0. We see that (1) holds for small if and only if
:
That is, when both individuals move up, the payo for i increases if and only if x j is below x c j : Likewise, it can be shown that when both individuals move down, i's payo increases if and only if x j > x c j + . To complete the picture we only have to note that if one player moves up while the other moves down, the former always decreases his payo while the latter increases it, which results in both moving down one period later. 
Conclusion
We have introduced a simple adaptive rule where agents choose a cooperative e ort on a grid. Agents can adjust this e ort step by step and Gains and Losses Adjust Directions. We have shown that this process converges to the fully cooperative outcome in an n-person Prisoners' Dilemma game.
There are a number of interesting open questions. First of all, how robust is this result? Does GLAD also achieve cooperation in other games?
To that question we have at least a partial answer. Whenever there is a fully cooperative outcome and agents use GLAD there exists a cooperative cycle. To see this, suppose all players are one grid point below x c i and, next, move upwards. Then, clearly, all players' payo s will increase. Hence, they will increase their degree of cooperation again. Now, however, all players' payo s will decrease as they have moved beyond the optimal level of cooperation and now waste resources. Given our adaptive rule, all players will now reverse their direction. Hence, they will be back in the cooperative outcome in the next period which means that payo s will have increased again. Accordingly, each player will further reduce their level x i . This, now will reduce all players payo s and they will go up again. And so forth. It is clear that such a cycle always exists|regardless of the actual payo function and this alone seems an intriguing property of our rule.
A further question concerns how well GLAD would do against other strategies. For thinking about this question it seems worthwhile to make a couple of observations about how GLAD performs in simple (non-stochastic) optimization problems. There it is straightforward to see that an individual relying on this rule will converge to the neighborhood of a local maximum where it will cycle around it. If the pro t function is concave, the individual will converge to the global maximum. While these observation may seem utterly trivial, they might be important from the evolutionary perspective.
A simple rule that helps individuals to solve maximization problems and, additionally, induces cooperation in dilemmata seems predestined to evolutionary success. 
